I have been working on a book with this title. I have a contract from Oxford University Press, and the book is now undergoing final review. It may change quite a bit before it is published. But here is the current list of chapter abstracts. I will need to submit a list like this (attempting to follow strict instructions, sometimes at the expense of clarity) with the final text. Feel free to ask for more.
Many serious problems affecting nations, regions, and the planet are the result of bad government or the lack of any relevant government. Populism leads to unsustainable budgets. Nationalism and other sorts of out-group devaluation lead to destructive conflicts and to lack of cooperation. Quasi-religious, essentialist, and moralistic doctrines reinforce laws and practices that harm out-groups (such as homosexuals) gratuitously. These harmful policies depend on the support of large numbers of citizens. Many citizens do not think well about political issues or how they use the little power they have individually. They accept parochial and moralistic principles without serious examination. They accept fallacious arguments and exhibit other biases. These problems can be reduced by actively open-minded thinking (AOT), which also helps in evaluating sources of information, and policies. AOT involves testing possible conclusions by looking for arguments against them, and avoiding high confidence in the absence of good reasons. Thus, effective citizens (who actually exist) have the virtues of cosmopolitanism (universal beneficence), anti-moralism, and acceptance of actively open-minded thinking (AOT) as a standard. Effective citizenship is consistent with a version of utilitarianism that takes our motivation as a fact that limits what we could do.
Keywords: voting, parochialism, actively open-minded thinking, moralism, utilitarianism, politics
Chapter 1: Introduction
Several problems, listed, result from bad government. These include world poverty, war, inequality within and between nations, anarchy, populist economic policies, isolationism, and unsustainable use of resources. These problems can be understood as arising from the psychology of citizens. We need research on how voters think and how thinking can be improved. Much research now is devoted to effective altruism, but that is insufficient. Government is needed even for altruism to be effective. Effective citizenship can be justified by a form of utilitarian theory which takes motives as constraints on options. In can be supported by social norms. Pessimism about democracy is unwarranted. We have reason to think that better thinking can matter.
Keywords: effective altruism, utilitarianism, democracy, government, anarchy, social norms
Chapter 2: Social norms for citizenship
Although critics of democracy argue that it doesn't work, it still seems better than the alternatives, and it could be better still if elections were designed differently and if certain standards were understood to apply to citizenship, in the form of social norms, that is, principles that are endorsed by some group, on condition that others in the group also endorse them. Three such norms are cosmopolitanism (impartial beneficence), anti-moralism (opposition to the imposition of unsupportable quasi-religious principles on others), and actively open-minded thinking (AOT). AOT involves looking for reasons why a tentative conclusion might be wrong, and avoiding overconfidence. These norms can be seen as virtues, each paired with corresponding vices, such as parochialism, moralism, myside bias, and overconfidence. Other utilitarian virtues are relevant, such as moderate altruism.
Keywords: social norms, democracy, culture, virtues, vices, cosmopolitanism, actively open-minded thinking, parochialism, myside bias, overconfidence
Chapter 3 General psychological biases as counter-norms
Research finds departures from the three virtues, on the average, but individuals differ greatly and some people show little or no biases. Parochialism, the vice opposing cosmopolitanism, can be dramatic: some people are willing to tolerate large numbers of losses to foreigners for the sake of equivalent gains to a small number of compatriots. Some think parochialism is a moral duty. But many people favor cosmopolitan voting, and still others think they should vote for their individual self-interest. Myside bias is a general category for several different biases, many of which are found to correlate with misbeliefs and questionable beliefs, such as conspiracy theories. Intolerance of uncertainty can cause overconfidence and acceptance of overconfident claims by sources. Single mindedness is another vice opposed by AOT.
Keywords: cognitive biases, parochailism, myside bias, overconfidence, single mindedness
Chapter 4: Deontology and the role of fallacious logic
Richard Hare's argues that moral judgments about what to do in a given situation are prescriptive (like commands, not like propositions that could be true or false) and universal (applying to anyone in exactly the same situation). Many common deontological arguments can then be seen as logical fallacies. In experiments reported elsewhere, subjects are presented with arguments for deontological choices that make things worse. (If the choices do not do that, they do not conflict with utilitarianism.) Subjects vary in their ability to recognize fallacies in these arguments, such as deficiency (missing premise), or over-general principles. Deontological rules tend to be simple, hence not universal and likely to have exceptions. Subjects with high AOT scores do better on this task, possibly because they are generally more inclined to think about thinking.
Keywords: deontology, utilitarianism, Richard Hare, fallacies, metacognition, actively open-minded thinking, ideal observer
Chapter 5: Self-interest vs. altruistic motivation
From the perspective of an ideal observer, rational moral judgments combine the preferences of everyone affected as if they were conflicts within one person. The option set for decisions may be limited by motivational constraints. Such limitation avoids the criticism that utilitarianism creates infinite or impossible obligations; they are just not part of the option set. This limitation also affects utilitarian conclusions about social dilemmas - in which several people face a choice pitting self-interest against the common good - other public-goods problems, and voting. Voting may be irrational if voters care only about themselves, or even if they care about their nation, but rational if voters are cosmopolitan, with equal altruism toward all (or even with some insensitivity to numbers). The motivational limitation also affects the use of the generalization test ("What if everybody did that?") and the veil of ignorance as reasoning devices.
Keywords: motivation, self-interest, altruism, generalization test, veil of ignorance, ideal observer, voting, social dilemmas, public goods problems
Chapter 6: Voting and charity
The effective altruism movement has focused on charity, so it is worth asking whether voting can also serve the purpose of promoting good outcomes. MacAskill once suggested that swing-state voting in the U.S. can be as effective as a large contribution. Brennan and Freiman dispute this claim. But voting can be effective. Voting to impose a rule that forces cooperation in social dilemmas can be especially powerful when the cost of spontaneous cooperation is too high but the cost of voting to impose a rule is much lower. And the threat of punishment may be sufficient enforce the rule without much punishment actually happening. Improved voting rules can make effective citizenship more powerful, and people have other ways to influence policy, such as contributing to campaigns (which is also a form of charity).
Keywords: Brennan, Freiman, cooperation, punishment, voting, socially responsible consumption, campaign contributions
Chapter 7: Heuristics and biases in charity and voting
Both voting and charity are subject to various decision biases, some of which are common to both activities. Charity suffers from diversification bias, evaluability of consequences, and identifiability of victims. Both activities are subject to parochialism, and to prominence of the most salient attribute. Parochialism in voting is exacerbated by a feeling of disloyalty when voting considers effects on outsiders. A few people engage in "expressive voting" without considering consequences, e.g., when the better candidate loses because a few have voted for a third-party candidate who could not win. Some people consider redistribution to be "forced charity" and are opposed to it. Individuals differ in all these effects, and effective citizens should be able to resist these distortions.
Keywords: voting, charity, expressive voting, forced charity, evaluability, prominence effect, diversification bias
Chapter 8: Beyond voting
Direct democracy is not useful for many issues, when voters lack the time and ability to make good judgments. Representative democracy helps, but that is one way among others of getting public input on decision making. Others include modification of election rules, such as proportional representation, ranked choice, approval voting, "deliberative democracy", and formal decision analysis done with a group of "stakeholders". Methods of eliciting preferences may also be useful such as conjoint analysis or budget games. Different types of decisions should be made in different ways. For example, decisions that need to be made quickly should be made by a single person or a small group (as in the military). Some decisions should be made on a case-by-case basis, others by application of a rule. Commensurability of attributes is often a problem in the more formal methods, but need not be so serious.
Keywords: direct democracy, proportional representation, deliberative democracy, decision analysis, conjoint analysis, commensurability, ranked choice, approval voting
Chapter 9: Parochialism and nationalism
Parochialism is the neglect of effects on out-groups. Parochialism, and its manifestation as nationalism, could be reduced by AOT, since much of it is unjustifiable. A variety of experiments and other studies have demonstrated parochialism, and it has several mutually compatible explanations, including the illusion that helping your group helps you. It is often seen as a moral duty. It can be reduced by approval voting, or by individual role-taking. Harm to outsiders from action is seen as worse than failing to prevent the same harm. Thus, reframing harm as an action rather than an omission might reduce parochialism. Presenting insiders and outsider as equally entitled to our concern also has a certain appeal.
Keywords: nationalism, duty, self-interest illusion, omission bias, approval voting, role-taking
Chapter 10: Moralism, paternalism, manipulation, freedom
Moralism, as defined here, is a vice, but we need to distinguish moralistic imposition from justified paternalism and other forms of manipulation, and more generally violations of freedom. Nudges are an example of attempts to influence choices. Sunstein argued that they are manipulative if they lead to impulsive decisions, but this is not necessary. An alternative view is that nudges are not manipulative when they increase overall expected utility. Manipulation would thus be deception leading to harm. From a utilitarian perspective, freedom is beneficial for some decisions but not others, and paternalism can be good, or it could turn into moralistic intrusion. These questions arise in the design of laws as well individual choices. Examples considered include free movement across borders, or euthanasia of infants.
Keywords: moralism, paternalism, manipulation, freedom, nudges, deception
Chapter 11: Functions of government
Utilitarianism, which justifies effective citizenship, can also be applied to types of policy questions that most governments face. For one thing, governments can efficiently solve social dilemmas by rules that force cooperation with the threat of punishment, and cooperation in the second-order social dilemma of supporting such rules is less costly than cooperation in the first-order dilemma. Governments can also provide public goods, such as police protection, education, and infrastructure. They can increase total utility by redistributing goods, helping those with less at the expense of those with more. Taxation, insurance, provision of necessary goods, and social insurance are all tools for redistribution. Inequality deserves special attention because it is international as well as national, raising the possibility of world government. Redistribution over time, between present and future, is relevant too, if we knew which way it should go.
Keywords: redistribution, second-order social dilemmas, public goods, taxation, insurance, inequality, world government, discounting
Chapter 12: Education
In the early 1980s, Luis Alberto Machado introduced a program to raise the intelligence of the Venezuelan people. Richard Herrnstein, who had argued that IQ was largely genetic, agreed to help set up the program and its evaluation. It worked, but we don't know why. Machado himself seemed to agree that simply improving memory, mental speed, etc., would just make irrational thinkers be irrational more quickly. But changes in cognitive style, AOT in particular, might help and might also lie behind various other observed effects of education. AOT can be taught. Another thing that might help make people more effective citizens is a little training in decision analysis, particularly concerning the use of probability. The difficulty of understanding decision analysis is overrated. Even a child can understand the main lessons.
Keywords: education, intelligence, Luis Alberto Machado, Richard Herrnstein, IQ, actively open-minded thinking, decision analysis, probability
